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CONSPIRACY: An alarming response to peaceful protest? 
ABSTRACT 
The proliferation of statutory and common law powers that can be utilised to manage and control 
public protest gives the police a wide range of options in any given scenario, and requires a careful 
balance to be struck between the maintenance of order and facilitation of convention rights. This 
paper discusses a novel use of the criminal law of conspiracy and considers the potential benefits of 
this approach and the ramifications for the protection of convention rights. It is submitted that the 
controversial use of the criminal law against Chinese dissidents in the United Kingdom was perhaps a 
result of the law of unintended consequences arising from the development of a body of law that 
has been piecemeal and reactive. 
1. THE PROTEST 
On October 23rd 2015 during the visit of the Chinese Prime Minister to Britain two Tibetan women, 
Sonam Choden and Jampel Lhamo, and a survivor of Tiananmen Square, Shao Jiang, were arrested 
during what appeared from descriptions to have been a small, low key protest.
1
 All three were 
arrested for offences of conspiracy to contravene s5 of the Public Order Act 1986. Shao Jiang was 
arrested first, as he neared the official vehicles heading towards Mansion Gate holding two small 
placards. A short while later the Tibetan women were arrested as they attempted to unfurl a Tibetan 
flag. No charges were brought, and Shao Jiang has now lodged a complaint with the Independent 
Police Complaints Commission.
2
 Lawyers representing the activists expressed surprise at the arrest, 
stating that they had not encountered the use of conspiracy to contravene s5 in any previous case.
3
 
This novel use of statutory provisions designed to control public order has the potential to 
undermine Articles 10 and 11 of the European Court of Human Rights. 
2. CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY 
CoŶspiƌaĐǇ deƌiǀes fƌoŵ the LatiŶ, ͞ĐoŶ͟ aŶd ͞spiƌae͟ ǁhiĐh tƌaŶslates as ͞to ďƌeathe togetheƌ͟4. 
The etymology of the word, then, makes clear that this must be an offence involving more than one 
person. The Criminal Law Act 1977 created the statutory offence of conspiracy, abolishing most 
common law offences apart from conspiracy to defraud, or to outrage public decency or corrupt 
public morals. The charge itself is rather simple to state but somewhat harder to prove. It must be 
shown that the defendant agreed with one or more others that a course of conduct should be 
followed which, if completed, would result in one or more criminal offences being committed by any 
of the parties to the agreement.
5
 It is no defence to show that the completion of the offence was 
factually impossible
6
, in keeping with the provisions regarding the inchoate offence of criminal 
attempt.
7
 
Jarvis and Bisgrove have considered the complexities that can arise when charging conspiracies, and 
point to evidence in the authorities warning against the use of conspiracy where substantive 
offences are available. They note that the charge may well be attractive to prosecutors either 
ďeĐause the suďstaŶtiǀe offeŶĐes do Ŷot adeƋuatelǇ ƌefleĐt the seƌiousŶess of the defeŶdaŶt͛s 
criminality, or where, if charged alone, those offences would not be sufficient to trigger the 
possibility of confiscation of property under s75 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
 8
 Their analysis 
focuses on examples concerning conspiracies arising from agreements to commit crimes which are 
in and of themselves indictable offences. However, in noting the temptation to utilise the statutory 
offence in order to achieve a secondary purpose (such as a greater sentence or confiscation 
proceedings), the authors identify the attribute which, it is submitted, renders conspiracy helpful to 
officers seeking to manage the activities of those involved in political protest.  
It is Ŷot possiďle to iŶdiĐt a peƌsoŶ foƌ the Đƌiŵe of ͞ĐoŶspiƌaĐǇ͟ aŶǇ ŵoƌe thaŶ it is to iŶdiĐt theŵ 
foƌ the Đƌiŵe of ͞atteŵpt͟ as Ŷo suĐh offeŶĐe eǆists. These iŶĐhoate offeŶĐes ĐaŶ oŶlǇ aƌise iŶ 
connection with a separate substantive offence – one conspires to commit an offence, or attempts 
to do it. In the case of conspiracy the effect of adding the prefix to the substantive offence may well 
be a way of increasing the severity of the charge the defendant faces, and of course the penalty they 
may anticipate. All offences charged as a statutory conspiracy are indictable only offences, crimes 
that must be tried in the Crown Court, and this is true even if the parties to the conspiracy have 
forged an agreement to carry out offences which, on their own, would only be triable in the 
ŵagistƌate͛s Đouƌt.9 It should be noted, however, that a charge of conspiracy to commit summary 
offences must be brought either by, or with the consent of, the Director of Public Prosecutions
10
 
although interestingly, the Law Commission have recommended that this requirement be 
abolished.
11
The Law Commission report also considered the suggestion that conspiracy to commit 
summary offences should itself be a summary matter, but noted a division of opinion in the 
responses received in consultation and made no recommendation on the issue. The CPS indicated a 
preference for such conspiracies to be triable either way, but the Criminal Bar Association argued 
that the fact conspiracy was indictable only acted as a deterrent to overcharging in response to 
difficulty in proving the substantive charge.
12
 
3. CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY AND PROTEST 
The use of conspiracy as a mechanism to control the activities of those involved in protest 
movements and, in particular, forms of direct action, is not new. Conspiracy to commit aggravated 
trespass was the mechanism used to frustrate the planned protest at Ratcliffe-On-Soar power 
station in April 2009 by pre-emptively arresting 114 activists. Ultimately, twenty of those arrested 
ǁeƌe ĐoŶǀiĐted of the offeŶĐe. Pƌess ƌepoƌtiŶg of the seŶteŶĐiŶg heaƌiŶgs Ŷoted the judge͛s 
commendation of the defendants for their personal commitment to the environmental cause as he 
imposed fairly lenient sentences of either conditional discharges or community orders. He refused to 
accede to the prosecution request for costs orders of £5000 per defendant (it was argued this 
represented a mere fraction of the total estimated costs incurred by the crown), awarding costs of 
£1,500 only against two defendants.
13
 Questions of whether the costs of prosecution were justified 
would only be amplified six months later as the case unravelled entirely in the wake of the revelation 
that the crown had failed to disclose the involvement of an undercover officer, Mark Kennedy, in the 
planning of the protest, a failing that resulted in all convictions being overturned.
14
 Irrespective of 
the view taken of making arrests that have the effect of preventing protest taking place, the 
ƌatioŶale foƌ doiŶg so is eǀideŶt. PoliĐiŶg diƌeĐt aĐtioŶ pƌotests is a ͞complex, uncertain, volatile and 
unpredictable͟15 task that runs the risk of degeneration into violence. MansleǇ͛s aŶalǇsis of pƌotests 
events in Britain over a decade shows that by the time of the pre-emptive arrests in the Ratcliffe 
case there had already been several large scale protest events across the country. Just two weeks 
before the planned action, a protest during the G20 summit resulted in 114 arrests, injuries to 7 
police officers and 1 protester and, of course, the death of Ian Tomlinson.
16
 Later, in October of 
2009, over 1,000 activists did attempt to enter Ratcliffe-on-Soar, leading to reports of violent clashes 
and injuries to both officers and protesters.
17
 If the police are in possession of intelligence which 
demonstrates the existence of a planned protest that would involve the commission of criminal 
offences then, legally at least, there is nothing controversial in the use of arrest for conspiracy. After 
all, it is arguable that one rationale for the existence of inchoate offences is precisely to enable 
proactive, rather than reactive, policing. 
There have been instances where protesters have found themselves facing conspiracy charges even 
though it could be arguable that, as the protest had begun by the point of arrest, charges for 
substantive crimes were an available option. Mead notes: 
͞CoŶspiƌaĐǇ ĐaŶ ďe Đhaƌged aloŶgside the suďstaŶtiǀe offeŶĐe, as a failsafe, and is a very 
ĐoŵŵoŶ pieĐe iŶ the pƌoseĐutoƌ͛s toolkit ǁheŶ dealiŶg ǁith all soƌts of pƌotests.͟18 
Most commonly, the charge is one of conspiracy to cause criminal damage.
19
 In some cases, 
protestors have faced heavy penalties: in 1986 twenty-four animal rights protesters charged in 
connection with a raid on a Unilever testing laboratory received custodial sentences ranging from 6 
months to two years, despite the majority of the defendants having few, or no, criminal 
convictions.
20
 
Of course, the protesters arrested for conspiracy to commit an offence against section 5 of the 
Public Order Act in October 2015 were never actually charged. They were all released on bail from 
the police station, and a short while later, released from the obligation to answer that bail, bringing 
the matter to an end. It is difficult to see how there could ever have been any realistic possibility of a 
charge (at least for the offence for which they were arrested) given the need for the consent of the 
DPP. There have been recent instances of heavy handed charging decisions, however. Academic 
researcher Lisa McKenzie was acquitted of a charge of criminal enterprise by joint enterprise, 
brought in connection with her presence on a demonstration during which another protester affixed 
a sticker to the window of a building. 
21
  
4. FACILITATION OR PRE-EMPTIVE CONTROL? 
Policing decisions may serve more than one purpose. Public order policing strategies may 
conceivably impact not only those present at any particular demonstration but also on individuals 
who may be deterred from attending future protests by concerns about containment, the use of 
force, or criminalisation.
22
 Deterrent sentences (such as those imposed in the wake of the Bradford 
riots in 2001 or the protests against the Israeli blockade in 2009), often imposed on young people 
with no previous convictions
23
, often contain an explicit statement of that deterrent purpose. 
Pre-emptive arrests could be criticised on the basis that they seem to serve an ulterior purpose of 
frustrating lawful protest. This seemed to be the case in the run-up to the London Olympics in 2012. 
OŶ the eǀeŶiŶg of the opeŶiŶg ĐeƌeŵoŶǇ, ϭϴϮ paƌtiĐipaŶts iŶ the ƌegulaƌ ͞ĐƌitiĐal ŵass͟ ĐǇĐle ƌide 
were arrested for breaching a condition imposed on them under s12 of the Public Order Act 1986. As 
Brander notes, despite lengthy periods of detention, only 16 of those arrested were formally 
interviewed. Many of those arrested, however, were released on bail with conditions precluding 
them from entering the London Borough of Newham on a bicycle, or going near any of the Olympic 
venues.
24
 Ultimately, nine were charged with the offence and five convicted after a protracted 
trial.
25
 During the same time frame, a number of graffiti artists were also arrested on suspicion of 
conspiracy to cause criminal damage and bailed with conditions which, again, were designed to 
ensure their absence from the proximity of the games.
26
 It can be seen from these examples, and the 
pre-emptive arrests of individuals said to be planning protests during the royal wedding,
27
 that the 
taĐtiĐ ĐaŶ aĐt as a ŵeaŶs of ͚stƌategiĐ iŶĐapaĐitatioŶ͛: a poliĐiŶg tool aƌgued ďǇ ŵaŶǇ to ďe aŶ 
increasingly prevalent method of dealing with diffuse and unpredictable forms of direct action.
28
 
Waddington notes that: 
͞[T]he poliĐe haǀe ƌesoƌted ǁith iŶĐƌeasiŶg ƌegulaƌitǇ to suĐh taĐtiĐs as the ĐƌeatioŶ of Ŷo-
pƌotest zoŶes, the use of ĐoŶtaiŶŵeŶt ;͚kettliŶg͛Ϳ, pƌeǀentative arrests and surveillance to 
seleĐtiǀelǇ disaďle aŶd, aƌguaďlǇ, ƌepƌess ĐolleĐtiǀe disseŶt.͟29 
The shift fƌoŵ ͚Ŷegotiated ŵaŶageŵeŶt͛ of pƌotest30runs counter to the recommendations made by 
Heƌ MajestǇ͛s IŶspeĐtoƌate of CoŶstaďulaƌǇ͛s ƌepoƌts ƌeleased in the wake of the death of Ian 
Tomlinson. The final report advocated an approach concentrating on facilitation rather than 
suppression.
31
 A study conducted at the subsequent NATO summit appeared to indicate that whilst 
the language of policing public order may change, the tactics for maintaining order are broadly 
similar: 
͞Though couched very much in the rhetoric of police facilitation, the police decision to 
stƌiĐtlǇ deŵaƌĐate the pƌesĐƌiďed pƌotest aƌeas, eƌeĐt ďaƌƌieƌs oƌ ͚peŶ-iŶ͛ pƌotesteƌs aŶd 
immediatelǇ Đlaŵp doǁŶ ƌoughlǇ, if ŶeĐessaƌǇ oŶ aŶǇ ǀiolatioŶs of theiƌ ͚ƌules͛ oƌ diƌeĐtiǀes 
were very much consistent with the strategic incapacitation approach͟32 
During the Chinese State visit, however, there was no attempt at facilitating effective protest. 
President Xi Jinping is an internationally protected person and therefore the police can point to 
international law as the justification for more stringent enforcement measures
33
. As Baker has 
observed: 
͚͞WheŶ eĐoŶoŵiĐ aŶd tƌade iŶteƌests aƌe at stake aŶd ǁheŶ ͞iŶteƌŶatioŶal pƌoteĐted 
peƌsoŶs͟ aƌe pƌeseŶt, poliĐiŶg has teŶded to ďe opeŶlǇ ĐoeƌĐiǀe.͟34 
This should not be seen as a novel development. Mansley ƌeĐoƌds the ͞ĐoŶtƌoǀeƌsial͟ poliĐiŶg of aŶ 
earlier visit in 1999, which led to accusations of Foreign Office pressure on the police to adopt a 
͞haƌd liŶe͟, aŶd aŶ aĐkŶoǁledgeŵeŶt that poliĐe ĐoŶduĐt had ďeeŶ uŶlaǁful iŶ the uŶƌepoƌted 
judicial review case R v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis ex.p. the Free Tibet Campaign and 
others.
35
 
The choice of conspiracy to commit a public order offence as the arrestable offence is, however, a 
new development and one that is worthy of examination. After all, there are a large number of 
alternatives available to the police. There has been, since, the Public Order Act 1986, a steady 
iŶĐƌease iŶ the Ŷuŵďeƌ of ƌespoŶses iŶ the ͞ƌepeƌtoiƌes of pƌotest ĐoŶtƌol͟36, and a general air of 
judicial tolerance for the operational decisions taken by officers engaged in public order policing (see 
the discussion below).
37
  
5. A STRATEGIC USE OF CONSPIRACY 
With regard to the arrests of Shao Jiang , Sonam Choden and Jampel Lhamo it is worth asking why, if 
the purpose was to contain or even curtail the protest, the police did not utilise the common law 
power to arrest to prevent a breach of the peace; a power with a scope so broad as to be 
͞ďeǁildeƌiŶglǇ iŵpƌeĐise͟.38 The Supreme Court have upheld the pre-emptive use of the power in 
the arrest of Hicks and others, where the arrest was designed to prevent disruption of the Royal 
Wedding. In that case, the court found nothing objectionable in the notion that arrest and detention 
primarily aimed at keeping the appellants out of central London until the wedding ended, and found 
it to be entirely consistent with the requirement for proportionalty
39
. There would, then, have been 
nothing controversial in using the power to remove Shao Jiang and the others from the vicinity had 
that been the purpose of police intervention.  
Reports at the time suggest that Shao Jiang was arrested as he stood near to the official vehicles 
headed towards Mansion House, holding two small placards. Sonam Choden and Jampel Lhamo 
were arrested in the same vicinity and were said to be waving a Tibetan flag.
40
 The substantive 
offence at s5 of the Public Order Act 1886 is committed when a defendant engages in conduct likely 
to cause harassment, alarm or distress to any person(s) within sight or hearing. It is not necessary for 
the crown to prove that any person was, in fact, caused harassment alarm or distress
41
. On the face 
of it, then, given that the three protesters were arrested during the small window of time in which 
they could conceivably have committed the offence – whilst the cars were in front of them – surely 
they could have been arrested for the substantive offence which would have had to have been in 
progress at that point if it was ever to have been committed at all. 
It is submitted that the choice of offence on this occasion was a strategic device which was 
potentially more advantageous to the police than either an arrest to prevent a breach of police at 
common law, or the substantive public order offence. In this instance the ulterior objective may not 
have been to nullify future protests as seen in the pre-Olympic and Royal Wedding arrests, or to 
seek a heavy deterrent sentence. The choice of offence afforded the opportunity to utilise the 
search powers contained set out at s18 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). An 
arrest for breach of the peace would not have afforded that possibility. Williamson v Chief Constable 
of the West Midlands
42
 estaďlished that use of the poǁeƌ ǁas Ŷot aŶ aƌƌest foƌ aŶ ͞offeŶĐe͟ ǁithiŶ 
the scope of PACE and accordingly the defendant could not rely on the statutory protections offered 
by the Act. This was noted, with approval, in the Court of Appeal judgment in Hicks.
43
 In both 
Williamson and Hicks the discussion of the applicability of PACE arose in context of an argument 
regarding the behaviour of the police towards persons in custody
44
. If the Police are not forced to 
comply with the obligations of the Act then surely it follows that they are not able to rely on the 
powers it confers. There is no legal authorisation for a search of premises following an arrest for 
breach of the peace, unless entry to the premises is made in order to effect the arrest.
45
 In any 
event, any search conducted under PACE, with or without a warrant
46
 must have the objective of 
obtaining evidence for the offence for which a person has been arrested (or as specified in the 
warrant), and is limited to the extent required to obtain such evidence.
47
 The Divisional Court 
dealing with the judicial review in the case of Hicks also considered the linked application brought by 
Hannah Pearce and Stuart Golsirat.
48
 The appellants were among a number of persons arrested the 
day before the Royal Wedding, on the execution of search warrants issued for the purpose of 
investigating suspected offences of handing stolen goods. The warrants authorised searches of three 
squats for suspected stolen computers, bicycles and bicycle parts. A large amount of computer 
equipment was seized. Alongside claims that the searches breached the appellants rights under 
Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights, they argued the searches were 
conducted in contravention of ss15 and 16 of PACE as the police either had an ulterior motive, or 
were looking for material not specified by the warrant. As Brander observes: 
͞It was common ground that the police did not have sufficient wedding-related intelligence 
to justify entering the premises on that basis. The issue was whether prevention of 
disruption to the wedding had been the dominant or a collateral purpose in executing the 
warrants.͟49 
The Divisional Court relied on the plurality test deployed in the case of Southwark to determine that 
the existence of an ulterior motive would only render the search unlawful in cases where the 
puƌpose stated oŶ the ǁaƌƌaŶt ǁas a ͞ŵeƌe pƌeteǆt͟.50 The finding was upheld in the Court of 
Appeal.
51
 
An arrest for the substantive public order offence would similarly have failed to authorise a search 
without warrant. This is a possibly unintended consequence of provisions contained in the Serious 
Organised Crime and Policing Act 2005 (SOCPA). The Act was a wide-ranging piece of legislation 
which included a number of provisions restricting the rights of protesters. The Act also amended the 
power of arrest without warrant contained in PACE by abolishing the pre-existing distinction 
between arrestable and non-arrestable offences. In this way, SOCPA significantly increased the 
power of the police by enabling people to be taken into custody for minor infractions provided there 
were grounds for doing so.
52
 Perhaps, then, as some sort of counterbalance to offer some 
reassurance regarding the rights of detainees,  amendments were made to PACE by Schedule 7 Part 
3 para 43 which states: 
͞;ϰͿIŶ seĐtioŶ ϭϳ ;eŶtƌǇ foƌ puƌpose of aƌƌest etĐ.Ϳ, iŶ suďseĐtioŶ ;ϭͿ;ďͿ, foƌ ͞aƌƌestaďle͟ 
suďstitute ͞ iŶdiĐtaďle ͟. 
;ϱͿIŶ seĐtioŶ ϭϴ ;eŶtƌǇ aŶd seaƌĐh afteƌ aƌƌestͿ, iŶ suďseĐtioŶ ;ϭͿ, foƌ ͞aƌƌestaďle͟, iŶ ďoth 
plaĐes, suďstitute ͞ iŶdiĐtaďle ͟. 
(6)In section 32 (search upon arrest), in subsection (2), for paragraph (b) substitute— ͞;ďͿif 
the offence for which he has been arrested is an indictable offence, to enter and search any 
premises in which he was when arrested or immediately before he was arrested for 
eǀideŶĐe ƌelatiŶg to the offeŶĐe.͟͟ 
This legislative provision, buried in the annexes of the Act, means that the police are not entitled to 
conduct a search under s18 PACE for a summary only offence.  
It is submitted that this may be the reason why the police in this case arrested the activists for such a 
serious, and evidentially problematic, offence. The homes of each of the demonstrators were 
searched, and computer equipment was seized. Without sight of the signed authorisation it is only 
possible to surmise that the stated aim was to find evidence proving conspiracy; it is difficult to think 
of any other reason that could realistically have been recorded. 
The question arises as to whether the arrests, detention and searches carried out by the police could 
be said to have constituted a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, and the approach that the domestic courts would be likely to take when assessing any 
such claim. 
6. PRE-EMPTIVE POWERS AND CONVENTION RIGHTS 
Arrests and detentions in connections with protests can be readily understood as engaging Articles 
5, 10 and 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights
53
. The search of premises may, in addition 
to Article 10, also engage Article 8
54
. The first three of these rights were considered by the House of 
Lords in R(on the application of Laporte) v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire
55
 which, when it was 
decided, was welcomed by many civil libertarians as marking a shift away from the traditional 
judicial deference to operational decisions made by the police to maintain public order. Fenwick 
suggested that the HuŵaŶ ‘ights AĐt heƌalded ͞a poteŶtiallǇ ĐliŵaĐtiĐ ďƌeak͟56 in the approach to 
articles 10 and 11. A decade later, with the benefit of hindsight, Laporte looks more like a historical 
anomaly. In that case, the divisional court, Court of Appeal and the House of Lords were all agreed 
that the indiscriminate use of the power to prevent a breach of the peace against 120 protesters 
travelling by coach towards Fairford airbase and their subsequent detention on the vehicles whilst 
escorted back to London could not be justified under either Article 5(1)(a) or 5(1)(b) of the 
Convention. The Court of Appeal was more circumspect than the Divisional Court, confirming that 
the decision to stop the protesters some considerable distance from the airbase was not in and of 
itself objectionable; drawing an analogy with Moss v McLachlan
57
 in determining that proximity and 
imminence are not interchangeable terms when assessing the legality of steps taken to prevent a 
breach of the peace.
58
 The House of Lords disagreed and dismissed the notion that there could be a 
situation authorising steps falling short of arrest in circumstances where an arrest would not, in fact, 
be justified.
59
 They went further, and reversed the decisions of the lower courts which had rejected 
the appliĐaŶt͛s Đlaiŵs iŶ ƌespeĐt of AƌtiĐles ϭϬ aŶd ϭϭ, aŶd held that the ƌespoŶse of the poliĐe ǁas 
disproportionate and therefore could not be considered a necessary means of pursuing the 
legitimate aim of maintaining public order.  
During the same time period as the decision in Laporte the claims of Austin and Saxby were winding 
their way towards the House of Lords. The case concerned the conduct of police during a 
demonstration held in London on May Day 2001. The claimants were amongst approximately 3,000 
people contained by a police cordon at Oxford Circus. The justification was that the police feared 
that the demonstration would be violent (and indeed there were violent incidents elsewhere in the 
capital on the day) and the containment was a necessary measure to prevent a breach of the peace. 
The group contained a number of people who were not attending the protest but who happened to 
be in the vicinity at the moment the cordon was imposed. The group were contained without 
shelter, access to refreshments or toilet facilities, on a cold wet day for over seven hours. The 
claimants argued the detention was a deprivation of liberty contrary to Article 5. In a decision which 
attracted considerable criticism, the House of Lords disagreed.
60
 Feldman, in his commentary on the 
Đase, aƌgued that the House͛s deĐisioŶ ǁas ďased iŶ paƌt upoŶ a ŵisƌeadiŶg of AƌtiĐle ϱ itself. The 
judgment noted firstly that there is a balance to be struck between the rights of the community at 
large and those of individuals; secondlǇ that the assessŵeŶt of ͞depƌiǀatioŶ͟ ǁill alǁaǇs ƌeƋuiƌe 
consideration of the particular context and lastly that Article 5 precludes arbitrary detention. 
Feldman noted: 
͞Unfortunately, the third consideration gave rise to a mistaken view that Article 5(1) 
guarantees only freedom from arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It does not. It guarantees 
freedom from deprivation of liberty, save in the specific circumstances listed in the Article, 
and even then only if the action is non-arbitrary.͟61 
It was widely assumed that when the matter came before the European Court of Human Rights the 
House of Loƌds deĐisioŶ ǁould ďe ƌeǀeƌsed. As Mead suĐĐiŶĐtlǇ aĐkŶoǁledged; ͞“adlǇ, ǁe ǁeƌe all 
ŵistakeŶ͟.62 The case is significant because, as Mead points out, it represented a departure from 
previous jurisprudence on Article 5 by emphasising context as a relevant consideration when 
determining whether or not the right was engaged.  It should not be possible to state that because a 
ŵeasuƌe of ĐoŶtaiŶŵeŶt ǁas a ƌespoŶse to ͞ǀolatile aŶd daŶgeƌous ĐoŶditioŶs͟63 it did not 
constitute a deprivation of liberty.
64
 The context, the balance of the many against the few, should 
only be relevant when assessing whether or not the deprivation was proportionate. In a second 
article, Mead suggests that the decision – the first time the Court had been asked to assess Article 5 
in the context of public order policing – ǁas a pƌoduĐt paƌtlǇ of ͞ƌeal-politik͟: 
͞If the holding had been that kettling was a deprivation of liberty, the police would have 
been very hard pushed to justify the tactic with reference to any of the permitted exceptions 
in Article 5(1Ϳ͟65 
The decision in Austin has signalled the beginning of a gradual retreat from the kind of judicial 
willingness to assert the fundamentality of the right to protest that some discerned from the 
judgement in Laporte. 
In this context, the likelihood of a successful Human Rights challenge in the Mansion Gate case 
begins to seem far-fetched. It certainly seems likely that any claim of a breach of Article 5 would be 
doomed to failure not simply by Austin, but also the older decision of Steel and Others v UK
66
 in 
which the court found nothing offensive in lengthy periods in police custody. Closer to home, the 
decision in Hicks also rejected the suggestion that detention aimed squarely at removing a person 
from a protest caused any problems in respect of Article 5.
67
   
The final paragraphs in the judgment of Austin, however, may seem to suggest that there could be 
greater merit in arguing that the treatment of the Mansion Gate protesters conflicts with Articles 10 
and/or 11. The Đhaŵďeƌ Ŷoted that ͞[t]he Court emphasises that the above conclusion, that there 
was no deprivation of liberty, is based on the specific and exceptioŶal facts of this case” and that they 
had Ŷot ďeeŶ asked to ĐoŶsideƌ AƌtiĐles ϭϬ aŶd ϭϭ, stƌessiŶg that ͞measures of crowd control should 
not be used by the national authorities directly or indirectly to stifle or discourage protest, given the 
fundamental importance of freedom of expression and assembly in all democratic societies.”68 
The application of Articles 10 and 11 will be assessed together, as it is clear that when dealing with 
protests, there is a very close nexus between the two, as the courts will often treat the fact of an 
assembly for this purpose as a form of expression. In Tabernacle v The Secretary of State for Defence 
69
 for example, when dealing with a claim that the application of bye-laws to effectively outlaw a 
peace camp breached Article 10 and also 11, Lord Justice Laws stated: 
͞That, I think, is on the facts not so much to be regarded as an autonomous claim, but rather 
as underlining the mode of free expression relied on: a communal protest in a camp 
established for the purpose.͟70 
Strasbourg has repeatedly emphasised the fact that Article 11 is capable of creating a positive 
obligation upon a member state to facilitate protest.
71
 In a fairly recent decision, the Court indicated 
that ǁhilst it ǁould take Đaƌe Ŷot to suďstitute it͛s judgŵeŶt foƌ that of the ŵeŵďeƌ state, it͛s ƌole 
was not limited to simply assessing the legality or otherwise of the measure in question and could 
include an assessment of the justifications provided
72
. In that case, the court found that the 
ĐlaiŵaŶt͛s aƌƌest aŶd deteŶtioŶ ďƌeaĐhed AƌtiĐle ϭϭ despite the faĐt that he ǁas paƌtiĐipatiŶg iŶ aŶ 
unlawful protest. The point was also made in Faber v Hungary
73
 in which the Grand Chamber 
reminded contracting states that: 
͞AŶǇ ŵeasuƌes iŶteƌfeƌiŶg ǁith fƌeedoŵ of asseŵďlǇ aŶd eǆpƌessioŶ otheƌ thaŶ iŶ Đases of 
incitement to violence or rejection of democratic principles – however shocking and 
unacceptable certain views or words used may appear to the authorities – do a disservice to 
deŵoĐƌaĐǇ aŶd ofteŶ eǀeŶ eŶdaŶgeƌ it.͟74 
It should be remembered, however, that the weight of the jurisprudence from Strasbourg confirms 
that states will be given a wide margin of appreciation as long as restrictions imposed do not have 
the effect of preventing protest altogether. In Chorherr v Austria
75
, for example, it was held: 
͞[The] margin of appreciation extends in particular to the choice of the - reasonable and 
appropriate - means to be used by the authorities to ensure that lawful manifestations can 
take place peacefully...͟76 
Fenwick notes that, given the wide range of permissible exceptions listed at Article 10 (2) (and 
replicated in Article 11(2)), it is rarely difficult for a state to find a legitimate purpose served by the 
imposition of a restriction. She argues that Strasbourg gives a wider margin of appreciation in cases 
concerning expression in the form of protest;  
͞…viewing measures taken to prevent disorder or protect the rights of others as peculiarly 
ǁithiŶ the puƌǀieǁ of the doŵestiĐ authoƌities, iŶ ĐoŶtƌast to its staŶĐe iŶ ƌespeĐt of ͞puƌe͟ 
speeĐh. Theƌefoƌe, eǆpƌessioŶ as pƌotest teŶds to ďe iŶ a pƌeĐaƌious positioŶ͟77 
In 2007 Mead undertook an analysis of cases concerning protest dealt with by Strasbourg, and made 
the often overlooked point that decisions of cases which are heard by the Court are outnumbered by 
applications which are rejected at the admissibility stage.
78
 What appears clear from his analysis is 
that a general approach can be discerned that suggests that the threat of public disorder can 
legitimise actions by the state that would in other circumstances amount to an unlawful 
interference. Nevertheless, both Mead and Fenwick highlight the reluctance of the Court to interfere 
ǁith poliĐiŶg of pƌotests that Đould peƌhaps ďe Đategoƌised as ͞diƌeĐt aĐtioŶ͟ – that is to say 
activities designed to prevent or disrupt the activities of others - whereas successful challenge to 
state aĐtioŶ is faƌ ŵoƌe likelǇ ǁheƌe the ŵeasuƌes takeŶ ƌestƌiĐt oƌ iŶhiďit ŵoƌe ͞tƌaditioŶal͟ foƌŵs 
of declaratory protest. The holding of placards signalling disagreement with the Chinese government 
would appear to be an example of the latter. On the information available in the public domain, it is 
difficult to discern any legitimate concern that the police could have had which would lead them to 
believe arrests were necessary to protect against public disorder. Even if it were to be found that 
there was a legitimate fear of disorder underpinning the decisions to make the arrests, then it is 
submitted that this may well be the kind of case in which the interference with rights of those 
protesting would be held to be beyond the parameters of proportionality.  
Consideration should be given to the notion that it is possible that the form the protest took was a 
secondary concern, and protection of the sensibilities of the Chinese visitors may have been the 
primary purpose. Of course, such a suggestion is speculative, but studies of the policing of anti-
globalization protests in other jurisdictions lend some weight. The authorities can, of course, point 
to the additional security obligations imposed by the UN Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons
79
. In a post 9/11 environment, it 
could be suggested, concerns regarding the security of visiting heads of state have multiplied and 
this could be justification for a decline in tolerance of protestors. Waddington has noted the political 
pressure placed on police forces charged with ensuring the safety of high profile guests
80
. Ericson 
and Doyle consider the example of the policing of the APEC summit in Toronto in 1997, and quote 
from a Canadian newspaper article detailing pre-summit negotiations in which, it was claimed, 
representatives from Indonesia and China made it clear they did not want their leaders to be 
publicly embarrassed by protests. Their close analysis of the pattern of policing of the summit led 
them to conclude that the actions by the RCMP went far beyond any that could be justified by safety 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶs aloŶe aŶd iŶstead ǁeƌe aiŵed at ͞ĐeŶsoƌiŶg aŶǇ foƌŵ of pƌotest theǇ ŵaǇ eŶĐouŶteƌ͟.81 
It is submitted that the possibility of political pressures on the policing of the Mansion Gate protests 
cannot be discounted, particularly when it is difficult to ascertain any objective threat to public order 
posed by the protestors. The sense of unease is aggravated by the draconian use of conspiracy in 
circumstances which do not appear capable of amounting to the offence, and where the only 
advantage of the use of the offence would appear to be the legitimisation of post arrest search and 
seizure. The difficulty, of course, would be in challenging the decision, and there is very little support 
in the authorities for a challenge on the basis that the search itself was illegitimate. It is difficult, if 
not impossible, to go behind a police claim that the search was authorised for the purpose of 
gathering evidence of a conspiracy to cause harassment, alarm or distress. The protestors may well 
feel that the seizure of equipment was simply an exercise in intelligence gathering about individuals 
actively (and lawfully) opposed to the Chinese government, but such an assertion is speculative. In 
any case, the courts have been relatively relaxed about finding that a secondary purpose of this 
nature is acceptable, and in setting a fairly low evidential threshold to accept that a legitimate 
purpose existed. This was the decision in Pearce
82
, and was a point made again in the case of 
Miranda.
83
 An argument that the deployment of s18 powers of search were, in this case, a 
contravention of Article 8, then, would be a difficult one to advance. 
The police have extensive and varied powers that can be utilised to prevent public disorder and 
crime during protests and in an age of terrorist attacks an increasing reluctance to interfere with 
their operational decisions can be discerned. The Convention may impose some obligation on the 
state to facilitate protests which are peaceful assemblies and legitimate forms of political 
eǆpƌessioŶ, ďut if the Đouƌts aƌe uŶǁilliŶg to ƌigoƌouslǇ defeŶd pƌotestoƌ͛s ƌights ďǇ eǆaŵiŶiŶg the 
proportionality of state action taken in the name of protecting order, then the outcome may be 
censorship. It is submitted that the arrests of the protestors for conspiracy to commit a public order 
offence is a troubling development that does not bode well for democratic protest in the United 
Kingdom. It is to be hoped that, if asked to adjudicate, the Courts would agree that this was an 
unjustifiable infringement of Articles 10 and 11. 
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